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Pursuing Democracy:  
Explaining Political Transitions in Nepal 
 
Prakash Adhikari and James D. Timberlake 
University of New Mexico 
 
 
Nepal has been struggling to consolidate a democratic political system for more 
than a half-century yet still does not have a working constitution. This paper is 
the first step in a larger research project examining regime transitions in Nepal. 
We review the existent comparative literature on democratization and 
authoritarian reversals in order to isolate some potential explanatory variables. 
We also focus on making valid descriptive inferences along these conceptual 
lines. What caused the failure of democracy in Nepal in the past? What are the 
future prospects for democratic consolidation? The literature has been divided 
along two lines, which we label as the Weberian and Neo-Marxist research 
programs. The former focuses on modernization and institutionalization, while 
the latter emphasizes class structure. We propose a multi-method research design, 
combining qualitative comparative analysis of most-similar cases with a 
longitudinal study of Nepal. 
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India started a wave of democratization in South Asia, a region believed to have been 
inhospitable to the development of democracy. Roughly at the same time India freed herself 
from British colonialism, Nepal did away with the ancien regime, bestowing sovereignty for the 
first time in the hands of Nepali citizens. Political parties succeeded in bringing down the 
centuries-old Rana oligarchy, but after a decade, they proved unable to manage and consolidate 
democracy. Failure to institute democratic practices and the pursuit of narrow party interests 
reduced the people’s faith in democracy, creating an opportunity for a return to an autocratic 
(Panchayat) system in 1960. It took thirty years for the public to regain faith in the party system, 
culminating in the ouster of the Panchayat system in 1990. However, a consolidated democratic 
system proved to be elusive once again. What was unleashed, instead, was one of the most 
destructive periods in Nepali history. The peoples’ war (jan yuddha1), launched by the 
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), resulted in the deaths of roughly 13,000 Nepalis. 
Meanwhile, the dysfunctional post-1990 political system paved the way for a comeback of 
autocracy in February 2005. This proved to be short-lived, though, as all of the major parties, 
including the Maoists, came together to force King Gyanendra out of power in April 2006. The 
wave of South Asian democratization seems to have passed Nepal by.  
                                                 
1 Michael Hutt, Himalayan ‘People’s War’, (2004), p. 5, n3. We are following Hutt’s example in using the value-
neutral term. 
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This paper is the first step in a larger research project examining regime transitions in 
Nepal. We review the existent comparative literature on democratization and political transitions 
in order to isolate some potential explanatory variables. We also focus on making valid 
descriptive inferences along these conceptual lines. Our conference paper is, therefore, 
exploratory in nature. We hope to explain past failures and future prospects for democratic 
consolidation in Nepal.  
We begin with a review of the two main strands of literature and establish the theoretical 
basis for our research. In the next section, we propose a way to test these theories in a small-N 
qualitative research design comparing similar cases. Finally, we present some initial data on our 
variables. As the paper is still in the exploratory stage, most of the findings are tentative and 
readers are urged to interpret them with caution.  
I. Literature Review 
A. The Weberian Research Program 
Modernization and Democracy  
One of the major research programs on democratization built upon Weber’s notion of the 
rationalization of social institutions. Modernization theory proposed a correlation between 
economic development and democratization (Lipset 1959; Jackman 1973; Bollen 1979; Bollen 
and Jackman 1985, Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Lipset (1959) argues that capitalist 
development is a pre-requisite for democracy. Development has a positive impact on four 
intervening variables. Wealth provides the material incentive for participation in the political 
process. Education contributes to democracy by increasing people’s “capacity to make rational 
electoral choices” (Lipset 1959: 79). Industrialization leads to increased urbanization and greater 
social density, which requires democratic participatory institutions. Others found that 
modernization does not necessarily produce democracy. Instead, a democracy “survives if a 
country is modern” (Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 59). Development creates a larger middle-
class, with a particular set of values conducive to democracy. Modernization built upon de 
Tocqueville’s insight that a middle class is less receptive to extremist ideologies because “only 
those who have nothing to lose ever revolt” (de Tocqueville 1945: 258). Following this 
argument, we would expect Nepal’s low economic development to account for its poor 
democratic performance.  
Institutionalization and Democracy 
Modernization may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a stable democracy. 
Stability depends on the “effectiveness and legitimacy of the political system” (Lipset 1959: 86). 
Effectiveness can be measured in terms of the capacity of the “bureaucracy and decision-making 
system to resolve political problems” (ibid: 86). This in turn is a function of the manner in which 
the bureaucracy is formed. We can then extend this idea of effectiveness to the party system. A 
party system is effect insofar as it addresses the issues of society at large. In other words, 
modernization increases participation and the demands that society places on the state. 
Authoritarian regimes are not receptive to the demands of the new middle class (Przeworski and 
Limongi 1997: 157). Legitimacy is the faith that society has in the existing political institutions. 
One way of maintaining legitimacy in emerging democracies is to preserve the traditional 
institutions during the period of transition. In Nepal, the lack of an institutionalized party 
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system2 failed to provide for an alternative venue for the representation of social interests and 
allowed the monarch to regain absolute power.  
Huntington (1968) identified a problem created by economic development. The process 
of modernization increases demands placed on the state and destroys traditional political 
institutions. During these transitions, it is difficult to construct "new bases of political association 
and new political institutions combining legitimacy and effectiveness” (Huntington 1968: 5). If a 
balance between "the level of political participation and the level of political institutionalization" 
is not attained, political stability cannot be maintained (ibid. 79). The imbalance will create a 
“political gap” leading to political disorder. Thus, modernization alone is insufficient for political 
stability.   
New democracies preserve their legitimacy through participation. Political institutions 
that provide an access for newly mobilized groups to participate in politics tend to be more stable 
(Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2005; Hagopian and Mainwaring 
2005). Conversely, groups adopt extremist ideologies if political institutions deny them a 
participatory voice, leaving them with no options but to adopt violence as the legitimate 
alternative. In sum, an established party system provides the major route for political 
participation, positively affecting the consolidation of democracy. Both in the 1950s and in late 
1990s, failure to institute democratic practices and the pursuit of narrow party interests reduced 
the Nepali people’s faith in democracy. 
B. The Neo-Marxist Research Program 
Another line of research explains liberal democracy as the outcome of a particular class 
structure. Marx had at least one point in common with modernization theory, which was the 
assumption that there is only one path of economic development, England being the archetype 
and all others following accordingly. Moore (1966), on the other hand, argues that the relation 
between and relative strength of classes are decisive factors in the form modernization takes. He 
finds that variation in the relationship between lord and peasant leads to one of three different 
types of modernization: the democratic route, a revolution from above, or communist revolution. 
India represents an alternate path to democracy, one that is accompanied with non-
modernization. 
Moore identifies three preconditions to the development of modern capitalist 
democracies. One is a balance between the crown and the landed upper class, often realized 
through violent means. This entails both the dissolution of royal absolutism and the preservation 
of monarchical institutions, or its functional equivalent, enough to check the power of the 
nobility (Moore: 417). A second condition is the development of commercial traits among the 
landed aristocracy which form converging interests with a rising, “vigorous and independent 
class of town dwellers” to oppose the royal bureaucracy (Moore: 418). The third precondition of 
a pluralist, capitalist society is the elimination of the peasant problem. 
A second route to the modern world is reactionary capitalism, which manifests itself by 
‘revolution from above’. Moore’s case study of Japan exemplifies what he terms ‘Asian 
fascism’. The defining structural feature was the ‘symbiotic antagonism’ between the samurai 
and merchant classes. The bourgeoisie was thus too weak relative to the state to carry out its own 
                                                 
2 This is not the same as saying there were no political parties in Nepal, but rather that the parties in Nepal did not 
function democratically.  
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revolution. Moore points to three reasons for the absence of peasant revolution in Japan. One is 
the system of taxation, which allowed the ambitious peasant to accumulate his surplus 
production. A second is the feudalism lasted well into the nineteenth century. In contrast to 
China, the bond between lord and vassal was very strong in Tokugawa Japan. Its cultural system 
was infused with the value of honor and duty to authorities. Third, repressive mechanisms in 
society were able to adapt from the old order to the modern commercial economy. “All in all,” 
Moore states, “it proved possible to take over the old order from the past and incorporate a 
peasant economy into an industrial society—at the price of fascism” (255). This is not to say that 
there were not abortive attempts at peasant insurrection, but the level of repression was sufficient 
to prevent revolution from below. 
Finally, Moore identifies three historical preconditions of communist revolutions. One is 
the absence of upper class transition to commerce “and the concomitant survival of peasant 
social institutions into the modern era” (Moore, 477). This is often brought about by the presence 
of a strong agrarian bureaucracy. A second precondition is the weakness of links between lord 
and peasant. In the case of China, the perception of upper class among the peasantry was one of 
exploitation, namely a lack of services performed by the landlord or priest “necessary for the 
agricultural cycle and the social cohesion of the village” (470). The third precondition is the 
“fusion between peasant grievances and those of other strata” (479).  
Nepal clearly seems to most resemble the case of China. The lack of a bourgeois class, 
the weakness of links between lord and peasant, and the existence of an agrarian bureaucracy 
indicate that modernization in Nepal, such as it occurs, will take the form of a Maoist revolution, 
rather than liberal democracy. Moore’s theory seems to have provided an accurate prediction of 
recent Nepali history. 
 
II. Research Design 
A. Constructing a Most-Similar System Design 
In order to test the existing theories on democratization, we propose a small-N 
comparison of similar cases. First, it is necessary to determine which countries should be 
included in such a research design. One approach is to adopt an area studies method and examine 
other countries of South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Maldives, 
Afghanistan). This method assumes that states in the same region share an array of cultural and 
socio-economic similarities. Another approach is more variable-driven, which is to look at 
countries with similar political histories. Specifically, we would want to examine monarchies 
without limiting our study to a particular region or time period. At the very least, Afghanistan 
and Bhutan are likely candidates for inclusion in our data set. 
 
B. Economic development and democracy in Nepal 
The modernization literature posits that there is a positive relationship between 
development and democracy. In this section we present a selection of economic indicators for 
South Asian countries. The comparison is limited to 1980 onwards due to data availability. Table 
1 present data on GDP per capita for five South Asian countries. Table 2 does the same for 
urbanization data. 
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Table 1. GDP per capita (Afghanistan, Bhutan, Nepal, India, Sri Lanka), 1980-2005.   
  GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 
  AFG BTN NPL IND  LKA 
1980 - 320.62 139.94 223.21 441.86
1985 - 391.95 158.45 260.35 523.7
1990 - 508.53 175.69 317.15 577.23
1995 - 654.97 200.03 372.46 704.4
2000 - 799.10 224.66 452.98 843.63
2005 - 1010.21 233.91 588.45 1009.69
Source: World Development Indicators  
 
Table 2. Urban Population (Afghanistan, Bhutan, Nepal, India, Sri Lanka), 1980-2005. 
  Urban population (% of total) 
  AFG BTN NPL IND  LKA 
1980 15.7 5.3 6.1 23.1 18.8
1985 16.9 6.2 7.4 24.3 18
1990 18.3 7.2 8.9 25.5 17.2
1995 19.7 8.3 10.9 26.6 16.4
2000 21.3 9.6 13.4 27.7 15.7
2005 22.9 11.1 15.8 28.7 15.1
Source: World Development Indicators  
 
Table 1 presents interesting contrasts between the five South Asian countries. Although 
Bhutan has never had a democracy, it is among the highest in terms of GDP per capita. 
Afghanistan is among the most urbanized but is also not a democracy. No single pattern can be 
observed from the available data in terms of a linear relationship between development and 
democracy. If modernization is the foundation of a stable democracy, Bhutan should be 
democratic. India has remained democratic and fairly stable for most part of the second half of 
the twentieth century but without any appreciable record of economic development. As shown, 
the annual average income was less than 600 US dollars by the end of 2005. These contrasts are 
summarized in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Development and Democracy in South Asia. 
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We can see that Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Afghanistan follow the pattern described by 
modernization theory, while India and Bhutan appear to be outliers.  
C. Institutionalization and Democracy in Nepal 
 Legitimacy  
In this section, we examine the political parties in Nepal during the two democratic 
periods. The Ranas ruled for over a century using coercion, until the feudal regime was toppled 
by an alliance between the political parties and the palace in 1950. Both the Nepali Congress 
(NC) and the monarchy started competing for legitimacy after the downfall of the Ranas. Signs 
of instability were “inherent in the design” of the coalition government headed by a Rana Prime 
Minister, which assumed office in February 1951 (Joshi and Rose 1966: 87). What followed was 
a period of endless instability, beginning with a reshuffle of the interim cabinet in June 1951, 
followed by the resignation of the NC party from the government, and the eventual collapse of 
the coalition government itself in November of the same year.  
King Tribhuvan, who was waiting for a chance to strengthen the legitimacy of the 
monarchy in Nepali politics, wasted no time in seizing the opportunity. Tribhuvan appointed 
Matrika Prasad as prime minister, instead of his more popular brother, B.P. Koirala. Differences 
grew between the two Koiralas and, as calculated by the king, Matrika Prasad resigned his 
premiership in August 1952. Unfortunately, the “institutional weaknesses of the government” 
and the NC party itself explain the lack of effectiveness and legitimacy of the government3. The 
King ruled the country for the next seven years, testing his own popularity against that of the 
political parties. His manipulation of politics and politicians continued until a general election 
was held in 1959 (Thapa and Sijapati 2003: 16). Although the NC returned to power with a two-
third majority in the 1959 election, it could not survive for more than two years when the king 
dissolved parliament on December 19, 1960.  
It is significant that the 1950s, during the first democratic experiment in Nepal, were 
dominated by endless conflict both within the major political parties and between the parties and 
the monarchy. The main beneficiary of the inter-party conflict, of course, was the King. He told 
the Nepalis that multiparty democracy is a “clumsy Western imposition incompatible with 
Nepal’s traditions, history, and objective conditions” (Joshi and Rose cf.: 395). Attempting to put 
a stamp of legitimacy on his actions, Mahendra promulgated the Panchayat constitution in 1962 
and ruled the country for the next thirty years. The general mass was frustrated enough to accept 
the monarchy as a relatively stable institution. The palace recognized this willingness of the 
people to acquiesce even before the political parties did. 
It took thirty years for the major political parties to win back the support of the people to 
oust the monarchy from power on April 9, 1990. The irony is that the parties did not seem to 
have learned the importance of party unity, as they ended up making the same mistakes during 
the 1990s as they did in the 1950s. Following an interim government, general elections were held 
in May 1991 under a new constitution. A total of 47 political parties participated in the election, 
which the NC was victorious, mustering 38 percent of the total votes. Once again, the NC party 
was chosen as the legitimate representative of the people. However, factionalism within the party 
soon resurfaced, largely due to dissatisfaction over the way Girija Prasad Koirala handled the 
                                                 
3 The first messages of distrust against the NC came on ground when the communist-supported candidates got the 
majority votes in the municipal election of 1953, which “assumed national importance” (Joshi and Rose 1966: 112). 
 6
day-to-day affairs of the government. Division between Koirala and Krishna Prasad Bhattarai 
faction of the NC party took an ugly turn in July 1994 when the former dissolved the parliament 
and asked the king to announce the dates for mid-term elections. This was followed by a period 
of instability in Nepali politics that continues today. The November 1994 mid-term elections 
resulted in a hung parliament and the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) —
CPN(UML), which won the largest number seats, being asked to lead the government. The fact 
that the NC failed to garner a clear majority in the mid-term election is an indicator that people 
started to lose faith in the legitimacy of the political parties.  
Meanwhile, the opposition NC called for a vote of no-confidence against the minority 
government in May 1995. Knowing that he would be defeated in the vote, Prime Minister Man 
Mohan Adhikari recommended the dissolution of parliament and called for fresh elections. This 
move was challenged by the opposition in the Supreme Court, which ruled against the Prime 
Minister. This was followed by a series of political dramas; five coalition governments and four 
premierships were produced during this period. All of the major political parties, except the NC, 
split into different factions. Nepali Congress won the 1998 general election with a clear majority. 
However, within a year, G.P. Koirala replaced KP Bhattarai as the PM setting in motion another 
period of political instability, culminating in the assumption of executive authority by King 
Gyanendra in October 2002.  
Table 3. Election results during the 1990s 
1991 1994 1999 Parties/years 
  Seats 
won 
% total 
votes 
Seats 
won 
% total 
votes 
Seats 
won 
% total 
votes 
Nepali Congress 110 37.75 83 33.38 113 36.14 
Nepal Communist Party 
(UML) 
69 27.98 88 30.85 68 30.74 
Rastriya Prajatantra Party 
(Chand) 
3 6.56 - - - 3.33 
Rastriya Prajatantra Party 
(Thapa) 
1 5.38 - - - - 
Rastriya Prajatntra Party  - - 20 17.93 12 10.14 
Nepal Sadbhawana Party 6 4.1 3 3.49 5 3.13 
Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party 2 1.03 4 0.98 1 0.55 
Samyukta Janamorcha, 
Nepal 
9 4.83 - 1.32 1 0.84 
Communist Party of Nepal 
(Democratic) 
2 2.43 - - - - 
Rastriya Janamorcha - - - - 5 1.37 
Independent 3 4.17 7 6.68 - 2.83 
       
Voters Turnout Percentage 65.15 61.86 65.79 
Source: Election commission of Nepal  
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As can be seen from Table 3, there was a big shift in the choice of the voters among the 
political parties. Of particular significance is the percentage of votes garnered by the pro-
monarchist Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP). The party went from winning four seats in the 1991 
general election to becoming the third largest winner in both the 1994 and 1999 elections. This 
can be taken as an indication that people were largely frustrated with the behavior of the political 
parties. People had seen ten prime ministers enter and exit the Singh Durbar in ten years .4 Lack 
of unity among the political parties and their failure to establish as an effective and legitimate 
alternative led to general frustration with the party system. A few demonstrations started 
appearing in the streets of Kathmandu asking for the king to come back and save the nation. 
King Gyanendra did come back in February 2005 but his move was rejected by the civil society 
as illegitimate. Gyanendra fell victim to his own misreading of the people’s sentiment that has 
largely been wiped out by the Royal Massacre of June 2001. King Gyanendra tried to legitimize 
his action by conducting the municipal elections in 2006 but this proved to be futile.  
To conclude, despite their faults, Nepalis accepted the political parties as the legitimate 
institution of representation. The paradox is that the political parties were given mandates to lead 
the government during the democratic periods at the same time that they were losing their 
legitimacy. 
Effectiveness 
One of the major indicators of effectiveness is the autonomy of the bureaucracy in terms 
of its insulation from social pressures. In this respect, the Ranas and the Shahs were able to keep 
the hakims (bureaucrats) happy by giving them several incentives. However, they were not 
legitimate because both the regimes did not represent the people. Finally, they had to make way 
for a more legitimate system. On the other hand, although they had a high score on legitimacy, 
the democratic governments formed in 1959, 1991, 1994 and 1999 proved to be weak due to lack 
of unity within the party itself or pressure from exogenous sources such as the palace and later 
the Maoists. As shown in Figure 2, their score decreased substantially on the legitimacy front 
when they failed to provide access to the larger social forces in the country.   
Figure 2. Legitimacy and Effectiveness of Political System in Nepal 
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Considering their limited time in office, and the challenges they faced from remnant 
sectors of earlier feudal periods, the democratic governments should be given credit for their 
achievement in the 1950s. To begin with, Nepal embarked on a planned economic path by 
issuing the first of several five-year plans. The interim government announced one of the most 
                                                 
4 This is not counting the ones appointed by King Gyanendra after assuming executive authority in October 2002 
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ambitious land reform programs in the history of Nepal (Thapa and Sijapati 2003). It decided to 
convert the tax-free land (Birta), into government land (Raikar), and abolished the traditional 
base of the feudal economic power (Joshi and Rose 1966: 160). It also introduced several 
administrative reforms and the annual budgetary system.  
However, the NC government did very poor in responding to the demands of the working 
class, both when it was in the coalition with the Ranas and in a majority government after 1959. 
The NC also remained antithetical to the interests of the elites in Kathmandu. Instead of taking 
them into confidence, NC leaders discounted the contribution of Kathmandu residents in the 
1950 revolution and contributed in widening the gap between party and local elites. 
Consequently, the political elites who had suffered during the Rana regime “openly opposed” the 
new government and the Nepali Congress party (Joshi and Rose cf.: 125-126). To the king’s 
advantage, distrust grew further in subsequent years. The monarchy was able to win the 
confidence of the business elites in Kathmandu. The regime survived for the next thirty years 
mainly due to the backing of the army and the Rana elites in Kathmandu.  
Compared to the 1950s, the democratic governments did tremendously better during the 
1990s. Several reforms were introduced, including a liberalized economic policy in 1991, the 
introduction of a land reform policy in 2001, and the abolition of the bonded-labor practice in 
2000. Nonetheless, most of these initiatives never materialized, and the countryside remained 
virtually unchanged since the 1950s. One of the significant differences between the two 
democratic periods was that in the 1950s a fragmented party system resulted in a conservative 
backlash, whereas the 1990s saw an additional force, the Maoists, contend the legitimacy of the 
party system.  
Conclusion 
 The Weberian research program indicates two paths to democratic consolidation, 
economic development and institutionalization. A system becomes stable when it is effective and 
legitimate at the same time. A regime which is relatively low in effectiveness but has a high 
degree of legitimacy can survive longer than an ineffective and illegitimate regime. The Neo-
Marxist research program, on the other hand, contradicts the idea that modernization always 
leads to democracy. The particular class structure of Nepal seems to be more conducive to 
‘revolutions from below’ than the establishment of liberal democracy.  
Several patterns can be observed from the modern political history of Nepal. Our 
findings, which at this stage are very tentative, raise the following questions. What is the effect 
of class structure on the linkages between civil society and the party system? What explains the 
fragmentation within parties? What has been the role of external international actors in political 
transitions in Nepal? 
Both Lipset and Huntington warn that gradual transitions rather than abrupt ones 
strengthen the legitimacy of new political systems. Doing so mitigates the sense of insecurity 
among conservatives and prevents them from using extra-constitutional means to abort the 
transition process. The implication is that the present haste to declare Nepal a republic without 
waiting for the decision of the Constituent Assembly may prove to be counterproductive.  
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